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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 of 
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann, §§35A-4-508(8)(a), 78A-4-103(2)(a), 63G-4-403; 
and Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Workforce Appeals Board have substantial evidence to support the finding 
the claimant was discharged from her employment with just cause? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The claimant challenges the finding by the ALJ and the Board that the employees 
testimony was more credible than the claimant's, which is a question of fact, and the 
standard of review is "highly deferential, requiring reversal only if the finding is clearly 
erroneous . . . and not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 
939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) 
The question of whether the employer had just cause to terminate the claimant is 
a mixed question of law and fact under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. In Pro-
Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) this court 
held that as to the determination of whether the employer had just cause to discharge the 
claimant: "we will not disturb the Board's application of its factual findings to the law 
unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." See also 
Gibson v. Department of Employment Sec., 840 P.2d 780, 783 (Utah App. 1992): 
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[T]he legislature has granted the Board discretion in determining whether 
an employee was terminated for just cause, [citations omitted] 
"Accordingly, we will reverse the Board's decision only if we determine that 
it is unreasonable or irrational." [citations omitted] 
STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim 
in Addendum A, and include the following: 
§35A-4-307, Utah Code Annotated (2008) 
§35A-4-405(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated (2008) 
§35A-4-508(8)(a), Utah Code Annotated (2008) 
§63G-4-403, Utah Code Annotated (2008) 
§78A-4-103(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated (2008) 
R994-405-201, Utah Administrative Code (2008) 
R994-405-202, Utah Administrative Code (2008) 
R994-508-305, Utah Administrative Code (2008) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
This is an appeal from an unemployment compensation decision by the Workforce 
Appeals Board (Board) of the Department of Workforce Services (Department). 
The claimant, Debbie G. Haggard, filed a claim for unemployment insurance 
benefits after her employment was terminated by the employer, Accent Surfaces. A 
decision was issued by a Department representative, who found the claimant had been 
discharged from her job for just cause and was ineligible for benefits under the Utah 
Employment Security Act §35A-4-405(2)(a). (All Utah Code provisions are found 
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sequentially at Addendum A, Department decisions at Addendum B.) The employer was 
relieved of benefit charges under §35A-4-307 of the Act. 
The claimant appealed the Department decision to an administrative law judge 
(ALJ) who determined, after an evidentiary hearing at which both parties provided sworn 
testimony, that the claimant had been discharged from her employment for just cause. 
Because the employer met its burden of proof in establishing the claimant was terminated 
for just cause, the employer was found eligible for relief of benefit costs paid to the 
claimant. (See Addendum C) The claimant appealed the decision to the Workforce 
Appeals Board. The Board unanimously upheld the decision of the ALJ. (See 
Addendum D) The claimant filed this Petition for Review seeking review of the Board's 
decision. 
B Statement of the Facts. 
The Workforce Appeals Board supplements and corrects the claimant's Statement 
of the Facts as follows: 
The claimant worked in the accounting department for Accent Surfaces from 
January 2006 to May 15, 2008. (Record, 9:33-34) The claimant was discharged for 
making an inappropriate remark at work. (R, 9:40-41) She filed for unemployment 
benefits on May 15, 2008. (R, 5:22-23) 
On September 19, 2007, the claimant engaged in an email correspondence with a 
coworker in which the claimant made inappropriate remarks about coworkers using foul 
language. (R, 8:6-15; 9:40-41) On January 16,2006, the claimant acknowledged receipt 
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of employer policy that prohibited this type of communication. (R, 6:24-26; 7:7-9) As a 
result of this incident, in conjunction with the claimant's poor relationship with her 
supervisor and reports of making disparaging remarks in reference to other employees, 
Suzanne Martin, the comptroller, was prepared to discharge the claimant on October 22, 
2007. (R, 6:44) The claimant committed to improve her behavior and the decision to 
discharge the claimant was changed to a warning. (R, 7:1-2) 
Following this incident, the claimant's behavior improved temporarily, but Ms. 
Martin eventually began receiving complaints that the claimant was talking negatively 
about coworkers and spreading rumors. (R, 12:4-7; 19:16-19) Ms. Martin confronted the 
claimant about the complaints on March 18,2008, but the claimant denied the allegations. 
(R, 12:21-29) The claimant was again warned that spreading rumors and talking 
negatively of coworkers would not be tolerated. (R, 12:21-24) 
On May 8, 2008, the claimant was asked by Ms. Martin to retrieve some files, 
which the claimant felt was not her responsibility. The claimant commented to Michelle 
Baker, a receptionist, "I guess that you and I are Suzanne's little niggers." (R, 16:31-39) 
Ms. Baker reported the remark to Ms. Martin on May 12, 2008. (R, 17:9) Ms. Baker 
testified during the hearing that there was no confusion about what the claimant said and 
Ms. Baker clearly heard the claimant use the word "niggers". (R, 16:29-39) 
The employer employs individuals of various ethnic backgrounds and it cannot 
tolerate racial remarks due to the psychological impact it might have on certain employees. 
(R, 13:15-16) This type of communication is also covered in the employer's policy and 
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is grounds for immediate termination. (R? 13:16-18) The final incident was evaluated and 
the claimant was discharged on May 15, 2008. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The claimant's arguments that she was not terminated for just cause are inherently 
inconsistent and not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. The decision of the 
Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
The administrative law judge is in the best position to determine credibility of the 
witnesses and the employer's testimony was more credible than the claimant's. There is 
substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and conclusions. The claimant was 
discharged with just cause as the employer met its burden to establish all of the elements 
of a just cause discharge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S 
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
This case centers around the claimant's behavior at work. Other employees had 
complained about the claimant's gossiping, name calling, and divisive behavior. The 
employer presented emails sent by the claimant calling other employees "fat asses", 
"ugly", and in a derisive way, "little princesses." The employer had given the claimant 
specific warnings about her behavior. After receiving warnings, the claimant's behavior 
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improved but only for a short period of time. The final incident occurred when a 
supervisor, Suzanne Martin, asked the claimant and another employee, Ms. Baker, to pull 
some files. The claimant was apparently unhappy about the assignment and said to Ms. 
Baker, "I guess you and I are Suzanne's little niggers." The claimant denied using those 
words and testified she said: "I guess you and I are Suzanne's little you know what." She 
testified she meant gopher. 
Both parties to the conversation, Ms. Baker and the claimant, testified during the 
hearing. The ALJ found Ms. Baker to be more credible and found the claimant did in fact 
say "little niggers". There is ample, competent evidence in the record to support that 
credibility finding. The employer explained that it has a multi-racial workforce and the 
claimant's use of that word would cause problems with other workers. 
The claimant had received warnings about her divisive behavior which included 
name calling and gossiping about other employees. In October 2008, the employer was 
prepared to discharge the claimant for her obj ectionable behavior. The employer met with 
the claimant in October about the intended discharge. The claimant promised the 
employer she would stop the objectionable behavior and the employer decided to give her 
another chance. 
The case rests on the credibility of the claimant and Ms. Baker. If the claimant said 
"little you know what", by which she meant "gopher", as she alleges she did, it would not 
be grounds for termination. The trier of fact is the appropriate entity to make 
determinations regarding credibility and those determinations should not be disturbed on 
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appeal short of clear evidence of abuse. As the Utah Supreme Court has held: "It is for 
the administrative agency, and not this court, to choose between conflicting facts." Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Department ofEmp. Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1312 (Utah, 1982). This 
court is limited in its review and cannot alter the findings of fact, as found by the ALJ and 
upheld by the Board, absent clear error. The correct issue before the court is whether the 
ALJPs findings, as adopted by the Board, are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, which this court has defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This court has further held: 
We defer to the Board's assessment of conflicting evidence. We are in no 
position to second guess the detailed findings of the ALJ which were 
adopted by the Board. It is not our role to judge the relative credibility of 
witnesses. "In undertaking such a review, this court will not substitute its 
judgement as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though we 
may have come to a different conclusion had the case come before us for de 
novo review. (Citation omitted). "It is the province of the Board, not 
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent 
inferences be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the 
inferences. (Citations omitted). Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of 
Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The finder of facts in this case was the ALJ, who had the opportunity to participate 
in the hearing and question the claimant and the employer witnesses. There is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the ALJ's credibility determination and it should not be 
disturbed. 
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There is ample evidence to support the ALJ's credibility determination. The 
claimant's version of the conversation is self-serving. She knows if she admits to saying 
something objectionable, she will be discharged. At the same time, there does not appear 
to be any reason for Ms. Baker to lie. Additionally, in support of the credibility 
determination, the claimant sent emails that support the allegation that she engaged in 
inappropriate language and name calling. The credibility determination should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE EMPLOYER HAD JUST CAUSE FOR 
DISCHARGING THE CLAIMANT. 
A claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits if discharged without just cause 
as defined in Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202, set forth in Addendum A. In 
establishing whether the claimant was terminated for just cause, the employer has the 
burden of proving: (1) the claimant's culpability; (2) her knowledge of expected conduct; 
and (3) that the offending conduct was within the claimant's control. See Bhatia v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah App. 1992). The employer 
must establish each of the three elements in order for the Board to deny benefits. Id. at 
577. The employer met its burden to prove all of the elements in this case. 
Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2)(a) (2008) states, in part: 
35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(2) (a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or 
for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a 
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crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interest, if so found by the division.... 
Utah Admin. Code R994-405-201 (2005) provides: 
R994-405-201. Discharge - Genu ;il IMmihuii. 
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in 
determining the date the employment ended. Benefits shall be denied if the 
claimant was discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which was 
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest. 
However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of 
benefits. A just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of 
the worker, A reduction of force is considered a discharge without just 
cause at the convenience of the employer. [Emphasis supplied.] 
The basic elements established by Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202 (2005) which 
are essential for a determination for a just cause discharge are: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would j eopardize the employer's rightful interest. 
If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no 
expectation that it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not 
be shown. The claimant's prior work record is an important factor in 
determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident or a good faith 
error in judgment. A long term employee with an established pattern of 
complying with the employer's rules may not demonstrate by a single 
violation, even though harmful, that the infraction would be repeated. In 
this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be 
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The worker must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer 
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm 
the employer; however, it must be shown that the worker should have been 
able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge 
may not be established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the 
expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a violation 
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of a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show 
the worker had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the 
worker should have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable 
conduct. If the employer had a progressive disciplinary procedure in place 
at the time of the separation, it generally must have been followed for 
knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe infractions, 
including criminal actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment 
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued 
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected 
of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of 
control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may 
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. 
While such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not 
mean benefits will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases 
involving a discharge due to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be 
shown that the claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a 
satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good faith effort to 
meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability 
and a discharge results, just cause is not established. 
In Gibson v. Department of Employment Sec, 840 P.2d 780 (Utah App. 1992), this 
court states: 
"[The Department rules] defining culpability require a balancing of 
the employee's past work record, the employee's length of employment, and 
the likelihood the conduct will be repeated against the seriousness of the 
offense and the harm to the employer." Id. at 784. 
In this case, the claimant had worked for the employer for over two years. During 
the last eight months of her employment the employer had received complaints from 
coworkers that the claimant was making inappropriate comments concerning employees 
and it had a negative effect on the working environment. At one point, in October 2007, 
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the claimant's supervisor had reached the conclusion that the claimant's behavior had 
become sufficiently harmful to the employer's rightful interests to necessitate her 
termination. Only after reaching an agreement with the claimant that she would amend 
her behavior did the employer allow her the opportunity to demonstrate her willingness 
to improve. The employer therefore issued a warning to the claimant instead of 
terminating her employment. 
The employer issued a subsequent warning to the claimant for similar behavior in 
March 2008. The claimant's supervisor discussed the employer's policy regarding 
speaking negatively about coworkers and warned the claimant that failure to comply with 
the employer's policies would result in termination. 
Ultimately, in May 2008, the claimant's supervisor was informed by a coworker 
that the claimant had made a racist remark. The supervisor determined this act to be 
sufficiently egregious to warrant immediate termination and the claimant was dismissed. 
The employer established how the claimant's speaking with fellow employees in a 
negative manner, especially with reference to race, was sufficiently serious or harmful to 
the employer to justify a denial of unemployment insurance benefits. 
The Board correctly considered the totality of the circumstances in determining that 
the claimant's conduct was disqualifying. The facts established at the hearing reflect that 
the claimant had demonstrated a pattern of behavior which had a seriously negative impact 
on the work environment. In this case, the Board determined the employer had met its 
burden to establish the three elements of a just cause discharge. Since all of the elements 
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of a just cause discharge were established, the claimant was discharged with just cause and 
unemployment insurance benefits must be denied. 
The actual facts in this case are the basis for the ALTs and the Board's findings and 
conclusions. The weight of the testimony and substantial evidence has been outlined 
throughout this brief and is adequate to support the Board's decision. 
POINT III 
THE CLAIMANT PRESENTS NEW EVIDENCE ON 
APPEAL WHICH SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
BY THIS COURT 
In her brief to this court, the claimant asserts facts which were not presented at the 
hearing or to the Board. Most of the information in the claimant's brief is new evidence. 
She has attached many of the exhibits used during the hearing and has appended 
explanations to many of them. Those exhibits were made available to the claimant prior 
to the hearing and she had an opportunity during the hearing to address each exhibit if she 
chose to but she did not. 
Prior to the hearing in this matter, the parties were sent an appeal brochure 
explaining the hearing procedure. The brochure also advises parties on how to prepare 
for a hearing and says, in part: 
Preparation for the Hearing 
The hearing before the ALJ is your only chance to present everything 
relevant to the case. A record of the hearing will be made, and the ALJ may 
consider only the evidence introduced during this hearing. Further review 
and decisions on appeal are limited solely to the evidence introduced at this 
hearing. Take time to prepare for your hearing. Know the issue or issues 
involved. Obtain documents that help prove your facts and provide them 
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to the ALJ and opposing party. Also, be sure to line up witnesses which 
support your side of the case, [emphasis in original] 
The parties were also sent an instruction sheet entitled "Hearing Notice 
Instructions". That sheet states, in part: 
PREPARING FOR THE HEARING: 
In order for the Judge to make the best decision, the judge must hear all of 
the relevant information about the issues listed on the Notice of Hearing. 
Be prepared to present all the information you want the Judge to consider. 
WITNESSES: If you wish to have someone testify, you must arrange 
for that person to be available at the time of the 
hearing. The best witness has firsthand knowledge 
of what he or she is testifying about. . . . 
DOCUMENTS: Enclosed are documents that may be made part of the 
hearing record. . . . 
If you have additional documents to be considered by 
the Judge, you MUST mail, fax, or hand-deliver the 
documents to the Judge and all other parties before 
the hearing. . . . 
Documents not provided in a timely manner may 
not be considered by the Judge. 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION PERTAINING TO THE HEARING, 
CALL THE APPEALS UNIT AT 801-526-9300 or 877-800-0671. 
[emphasis in original] 
The administrative law judge also told each of the parties, at the beginning of the 
hearing, to be sure and present all the evidence the party wants to be considered during the 
hearing. 
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Department rules provide: 
R994-508-305. Decisions of the Board. 
(2) Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, 
the Board will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was 
reasonably available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the 
ALJ. 
The new evidence in the claimant's brief was known at the time of the hearing and 
the claimant could have presented that evidence at that time. The claimant has not given 
any reason why this new evidence was not presented during the hearing. She has not 
shown extraordinary circumstances which would justify admission of this evidence now. 
Accepting this new evidence would deprive the employer of its right to confront witness 
and rebut testimony. The "facts" as alleged in the claimant's brief should not be 
considered. 
POINT IV 
THE CLAIMANT'S ALLEGATIONS OF 
DISCRIMINATION ARE NOT RELEVANT AND ARE 
NEW EVIDENCE. 
The claimant included documents in her brief which appear to be filings with the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division of the Utah State Labor Commission. It appears the 
claimant has filed a complaint with that division alleging age discrimination and sexual 
harassment. There is no evidence in the record of this case to support an allegation of 
discrimination or harassment. Additionally, discrimination is not relevant here. The 
claimant was discharged for a long history of behavioral problems including disruptive 
gossiping about other employees. The final incident occurred when she used racist 
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language which was so offensive to Ms. Baker that she reported it to the supervisor. The 
claimant was not discharged because of her age; she was discharged because of her 
behavior. 
POINT III 
THE CLAIMANT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HER ARGUMENTS 
THAT THE ALJfS FINDINGS WERE INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE EVIDENCE AND THAT THE ALJ 
ABUSED HER DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY. 
The claimant's brief does not address the finding that she used the word "nigger" 
or that the employer's witnesses were more credible. In order to successfully challenge 
these findings, the claimant "must demonstrate that the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." The 
court should reject the claimant's appeal for her failure to marshal the evidence in support 
of her conclusion that the findings were without foundation. The Board recognizes that 
the claimant is proceeding pro se and might not be held to the strict procedural standards 
expected of claimants who are represented by counsel. However, the burden when 
challenging a factual finding is an extremely heavy one and the claimant has presented no 
evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this burden. 
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Court refused to 
entertain the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its marshaling 
burden: 
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the 
finding nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead 
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cites only evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crooks ton 
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence 
favorable to one's position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden. 
.."). We therefore assume that the record supports the finding of the 
trial court. Id. at 820. (Emphasis added) 
This court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in 
Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (UtahCt. App. 
1994): 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when 
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1052. 
The court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
"appelhite counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves] 
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court 
further explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to: 
. . . present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App. 1991); accord/« re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. 
v. Clayton, 863 P.2d29,36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 
849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Oneida at 1053. 
Then, after an appellant has established: 
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support 
the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must 
show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Bartell, 116 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 143 P.2d at 193). Oneida at 1053. 
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The claimant here has made no attempt to meet her marshaling burden. She has 
pointed to no evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against 
the clear weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." Instead, the claimant 
argues alleged facts that were not in evidence before the ALJ or the Board. The record 
below is supported by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also 
Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
where this court held that: 
. . . the 'whole record test' necessarily requires that a party challenging the 
Board's findings of fact must marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The claimant has raised no competent argument to show the Board's decision is 
either unreasonable or irrational. The determinations of fact made by the Board are 
neither capricious nor arbitrary and are well supported by the evidence and testimony in 
the record. The claimant was discharged with just cause and the decision of the Board 
should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 2008. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
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ADDENDUM A 
35A-4-508. Review of decision or determination by division — Administrative law 
judge — Division of adjudication -- Workforce Appeals Board — 
Judicial review by Court of Appeals — Exclusive procedure. 
(8)(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued, 
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of 
appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which 
action any other party to the proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be 
made a defendant. 
ADDENDUM A 
63G-4-403. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action 
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review 
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, 
or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
ADDENDUM A 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction, 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
ADDENDUM A 
35A-4-307. Social costs — Relief of charges. 
(1) Social costs shall consist of those benefit costs defined as follows: 
(a) Benefit costs of an individual will not be charged to a base-period 
employer, but will be considered social costs if the individual's separation from that 
employer occurred under any of the following circumstances: 
(i) the individual was discharged by the employer or voluntarily quit 
employment with the employer for disqualifying reasons, but subsequently requalified 
for benefits and actually received benefits; 
(ii) the individual received benefits following a quit which was not attributable 
to the employer; 
(iii) the individual received benefits following a discharge for nonperformance 
due to medical reasons; or 
(iv) the individual received benefits while attending the first week of mandatory 
apprenticeship training. 
(b) Social costs are benefit costs which are or have been charged to employers 
who have terminated coverage and are no longer liable for contributions, less the amount 
of contributions paid by such employers during the same time period. 
(c) The difference between the benefit charges of all employers whose benefit 
ratio exceeds the maximum overall contribution rate and the amount determined by 
multiplying the taxable payroll of the same employers by the maximum overall 
contribution rate is a social cost. 
(d) Benefit costs attributable to a concurrent base-period employer will not be 
charged to that employer if the individual's customary hours of work for that employer 
have not been reduced. 
(e) Benefit costs incurred during the course of division-approved training 
which occurs after December 31, 1985, will not be charged to base-period employers. 
(f) Benefit costs will not be charged to employers if such costs are attributable 
to: 
(i) the state's share of extended benefits; 
(ii) uncollectible benefit overpayments; 
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(iii) the proportion of benefit costs of combined wage claims that are chargeable 
to Utah employers and are insufficient when separately considered for a monetary eligible 
claim under Utah law and which have been transferred to a paying state; and 
(iv) benefit costs attributable to wages used in a previous benefit year that are 
available for a second benefit year under Subsection 35-4-401(2) because of a change in 
method of computing base-periods, overlapping base-periods, or for other reasons 
required by law. 
(g) Any benefit costs that are not charged to an employer and not defined in 
this subsection are also social costs. 
(2) Subsection (1) applies only to contributing employers and not to employers 
that have elected to finance the payment of benefits in accordance with Section 35A-4-
309or35A-4-311. 
ADDENDUM A 
35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits. 
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for 
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(2)(a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or for an 
act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which is 
deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found 
by the division, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six 
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
ADDENDUM A 
R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance. 
R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits. 
R994-405-201. Discharge - General Definition. 
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in determining 
the date the employment ended. Benefits will be denied if the claimant was discharged for 
just cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a 
crime, which was deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful 
interest. However, not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a denial of benefits. A 
just cause discharge must include some fault on the part of the claimant. A reduction of 
force is considered a discharge without just cause. 
ADDENDUM A 
R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance. 
R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits. 
R994-405-202. Just Cause. 
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must 
be satisfied: 
(1) Culpability. 
The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the 
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the conduct 
was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it would be 
continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's prior work 
record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an isolated incident 
or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able to demonstrate that a 
single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a long-term employee with 
an established pattern of complying with the employer's rules In this instance, depending 
on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be necessary for the employer to discharge 
the claimant to avoid future harm. 
(2) Knowledge. 
The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. 
There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer; however, 
it must be shown the claimant should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of 
the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a 
clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in the case of a 
violation of a universal standard of conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the 
claimant had knowledge of the expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should 
have been given an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had 
a progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally 
must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very 
severe infractions, including criminal actions. 
(3) Control. 
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimants 
control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are not 
sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued inefficiency, repeated 
carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a reasonable person in a similar 
circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the claimant had the ability to perform 
ADDENDUM A 
satisfactorily. 
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may be 
necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While such a 
circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits will be 
denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due to 
unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to perform 
the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good faith 
effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill or ability and a 
discharge results, just cause is not established. 
ADDENDUM A 
R994. Workforce Services, Unemployment Insurance. 
R994-508. Appeal Procedures. 
R994-508-305. Decisions of the Board. 
(1) The Board has the discretion to consider and render a decision on any issue 
in the case even if it was not presented at the hearing or raised by the parties on appeal. 
(2) Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the Board will 
not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably available and 
accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. 
(3) The Board has the authority to request additional information or evidence, if 
necessary. 
(4) The Board may remand the case to the Department or the ALJ when 
appropriate. 
(5) A copy of the decision of the Board, including an explanation of the right to 
judicial review, will be delivered or mailed to the interested parties. 
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Benefits are denied under Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act beginning May 18 2008 and ending when 
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NUMBER AND CURRENT ADDRESS Also, please state the reason for your appeal A copy of your appeal will be sent to any 
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DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
APPEALS SECTION 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Appellant 
DEBBIE G HAGGARD 
6422 W 3860 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84128-3545 
Respondent 
ACCENT SURFACES 
%NATL EMPLOYERS COUNCIL INC DBA 
PO BOX 4816 
SYRACUSE NY 13221-4816 
S.S.A.NO: XXX-XX-7931 CASE NO: 08-A-03756 
APPEAL DECISION: The claimant is denied unemployment insurance benefits. 
The employer is relieved of charges. 
CASE HISTORY; 
Appearances: 






The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the claimant was 
discharged for inappropriate behavior. That decision also relieved the employer's benefit ratio account for 
benefits paid to the claimant. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from June 26,2008, 
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT 
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the grounds 
upon which the appeal is made. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The claimant worked in the accounting department. On September 19, 2007, the claimant engaged in an 
email correspondence with a coworker in which the claimant made inappropriate remarks about coworkers 
using foul language. On January 21, 2007, the claimant acknowledged receipt of employer policy that 
prohibited this type of communication. As a result of this incident, in conjunction with the claimant's poor 
relationship with her supervisor and reports of making disparaging remarks in reference to other employees, 
Suzanne Martin, the comptroller, was prepared to discharge the claimant on October 22,2007. The claimant 
committed to improve her behavior and the decision to discharge the claimant was changed to a warning. 
<P7 
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Following this incident, the claimant's behavior improved temporanly> but Ms Martin eventually began 
receiving complaints that the claimant was talking negatively about coworkers and spreading rumors 
Ms Martin confronted the claimant about the complaints on March 18, 2008, but the claimant denied the 
allegations Despite a lack of evidence, the claimant was warned that spreading rumors and talking 
negatively of coworkers would not be tolerated 
On May 8, 2008, the claimant was asked by Ms Martin to retrieve some files, which the claimant felt was 
not her responsibility The claimant commented to Michelle Baker, a receptionist, "I guess that you and I 
are Suzanne's little niggers" Ms Baker reported the remark to Ms Martin on May 12, 2008 
1 he employer employs individuals of vanous ethnic backgrounds and it cannot tolerate racial remarks due 
to the psychological impact it might have on certain employees This type of communication is also covered 
in the employer's policy and is grounds for immediate termination The final incident was evaluated and the 
claimant was discharged on May 15, 2008 
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; 
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the 
employee In order to havejust cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35 A-4-405(2)(a) there must be fault 
on the part of the employee involved The basic factors as established by the Rules pertaining to Section 
3 5 A-4-405(2)(a) which are essential for a determination of ineligibility under the definition ofjust cause are 
(a) Culpability The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing 
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests 
(b) Knowledge The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected 
(c) Control The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's 
control 
The claimant denied making the remark cited by the employer, but claims that she made the following 
remark,M1 guess that you and 1 are Suzanne's little you know whats," and by "you know whats" she meant 
"gophers" Ms Baker testified without hesitation that the claimant said "niggers" The claimant admitted 
to engaging in a disparaging email correspondence in September 2007 in which she referred to coworkers 
in a negative manner using foul language Taking the September event into consideration, Ms Baker's 
testimony that the claimant used a racial slur is considered more credible than that of the claimant The word 
used by the claimant is universally understood to be extremely provocative and use of such a word in the 
workplace contributes to a hostile work environment It was within the employer's right to enforce its policy 
which does not tolerate this type of comment in the workplace Culpability is shown 
The claimant acknowledged receipt of the employer's policy which prohibits the use of offensive «md racially 
charged language in the workplace The claimant also agrees that she was warned for similar behavior in 
connection with an email correspondence that occurred September 19, 2007 The claimant should ha\e 
known that making a racially sensitive remark could jeopardize her job Knowledge is shown 
A D D E N D U M C 
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The claimant's choice of words was within her control. Control is shown. 
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the employer has established the three elements of just cause and 
benefits are denied. 
An employer may be relieved of charges when the claimant was separated from employment for reasons 
which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35 A-4-405( 1) or Section 35 A-4-405(2) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. In this case the reason for the claimant's separation is disqualifying; 
therefore, the employer is relieved of charges. 
DECISION AND ORDER: 
The original Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to 
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied effective 
May 18,2008, and continuing until the claimant has worked and earned at least six times her weekly benefit 
amount in bona fide covered employment and is otherwise eligible. 
The employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section 35 A-4-
307 of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Roman Rubalcava 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES 
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D E B B I E G. H A G G A R D , CLAIMANT 
S.S.A.No.XXX-XX-8140 : 
: Case No. 08-B-00321 
ACCENT SURFACES, : 
EMPLOYER 
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed. 
Benefits are denied. 
The Employer is relieved of benefit charges. 
HISTORY OF CASE: 
In a decision dated June 27, 2008, Case No. 08-A-03756, the Administrative Law Judge affirmed 
the Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective 
May 18, 2008. The Employer, Accent Surfaces, was eligible for relief of benefit charges in 
connection with a future claim. 
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD: 
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah 
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto. 
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: June 27, 2008 
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT: 
1. Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of 
§35A-4-405(2)(a)? 
2. Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)? 
FACTUAL FINDINGS: 
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Claimant worked for the Employer in its accounting department. The Claimant had some issues 
relating to getting along with her coworkers. The Claimant was nearly discharged in October 2007 
over an email she sent referring to one of her coworkers as an "ass." The Employer elected not to 
discharge the Claimant after she committed to improving her attitude. The Claimant's attitude 
improved for a period of time, and then began to deteriorate again, and the Employer began receiving 
complaints regarding the Claimant. The final incident occurred when the Claimant, who was upset 
about having to locate some files for her supervisor, told another employee, "I guess you and I are 
Suzanne's little niggers." The Employer discharged the Claimant, and the Administrative Law Judge 
found the discharge was for just cause. 
On appeal to the Board the Claimant takes exception with the findings of fact of the Administrative 
Law Judge. Specifically, the Claimant argues that she never made the comment about being 
"Suzanne's nigger." The Claimant maintains that she said that she was "Suzanne's little you-know-
what." When parties present conflicting testimony the Administrative Law Judge must make a 
credibility determination. Here the Administrative Law Judge found the testimony of the Employer's 
witnesses to be more credible than that of the Claimant. The Board, on appeal, will generally not 
disturb the credibility determination of an Administrative Law Judge absent clear error, whereas the 
Administrative Law Judge is able to listen to the testimony and question the witnesses, unlike the 
Board who reads the record. The Board has reviewed the record in this case and finds that the 
testimony and evidence supports the credibility determination of the Administrative Law Judge and 
there is no clear error which would justify reversal of the credibility determination of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
Next the Claimant goes tlirough each of the emails submitted by the Employer and refutes or 
explains each email. The emails were all prior lo the Claimant's near termination in October 2007 
and do not relate to the final incident. The emails reflect the interpersonal problems the Claimant 
had with her coworkers and supervisor, and Further support the credibility determination of the 
Administrative Law Judge. The Claimant argues that the emails show that other employees were 
using profanity and gossiping and were not disciplined by the Employer. The Claimant maintains 
the Employer sought to discharge her. While it is true that several of these email do contain 
profanity by others, there is no testimony or evidence to support the Claimant's allegation that these 
employees were not disciplined. It is speculation on the part of the Claimant. Furthermore, the final 
incident in which she referred to herself and another coworker as "Suzanne's little niggers," was 
significantly more serious than the language used in the emails. Given the Claimant's past conduct 
and the warning she received from the Employer regarding professionalism in the workplace, when 
the Claimant made the final comment it was necessary for the Employer to discharge the Claimant 
in order to protect its rightful interest. 
The Board affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and adopts in full his reasoning and 
conclusions of law. 
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DECISION: 
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying unemployment insurance benefits to the 
Claimant effective April 27, 2008, under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, is affirmed. 
The Employer, A Plus Benefits, is eligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with this claim 
as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act. 
APPEAL RIGHTS: 
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request 
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request 
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to 
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered 
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing 
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a 
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This 
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for 
such an appeal. 
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in 
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the 
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board, 
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ 
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD 
l] 
0vA7^J 
Date Issued: July 31. 2008 S**&/ ^ y£&^' 
TV, GE RH/RR/SD/del s? ^ ~ - s 
f s ** r^j^- — - • —<n rf, ^ C\ Q 
ADDENDUM D 
08-B-00321 - 4 - XXX-XX-7931 
DEBBIE G. HAGGARD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECISION to be sen'ed upon each of the following on 
this 31st day of July, 2008, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
United States mail to: 
DEBBIE G HAGGARD 
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ADDENDUM E 
JUDGE Along with the hearing notice, documents the Department used to make the original 
decision were mailed to both parties. I am referring specifically to documents marked 
as Exhibits 1 through 39. Ms. Haggard, do you have those documents with you now? 
CLAIMANT I do. 
JUDGE Mr. Hunter, do you have those documents? 
HUNTER I do. 
JUDGE Mr. Kirby, do you have those documents in your office? 
KIRBY I do. 
JUDGE And Ms. Martin, do you have those documents with you? 
MARTIN Yes. 
JUDGE I am going to identify each document for the record. After I am done I will ask if either 
party has any objections to me considering these documents today. The first four 
exhibits is a print out of the claimant's initial unemployment claim. Exhibit #1 
indicates the claim was opened May 15, 2008. Exhibit #2 shows responses to eligibility 
questions. At the bottom of Exhibit #2 it indicates the claimant reported her last 
employer as Accent Surfaces, last day of work April 15,2008 and reason for separation 
was discharge. Exhibit # 3 shows instruction given after the claim was opened and 
Exhibit # 4 is the final page of instruction. Exhibits 5 and 6 are both titled Official 
Notice of Claim Filed. Exhibit # 5 indicates the last day of work as reported by the 
employer was May 15, 2008 and that the claimant worked in accounting. Exhibit # 6 
the employer reported reason for separation was discharge. It also specifies the claimant 
was discharged for inappropriate conduct. Claimant made comments of a racial nature. 
Documentation to follow. I'm showing this was completed by Nicole Turrow. Mr. 
Hunter, is she an employee of National Employers' council or of Accent Surfaces? 
HUNTER She is an employer of National—an employee of National Employers' Council. 
JUDGE So the information she reported on this form was provided by Accent Surfaces? 
HUNTER Correct. 
JUDGE Exhibit # 7 is titled Termination Notice, showing Ms. Haggard's name and social 
security number and the date is May 15, 2008. It goes on to specify the comment that 















































signature dated May 15, 2008 but I cannot read the signature. Whose signature is that, 
Mr. Hunter? 
HUNTER Urn— 
JUDGE Should I ask Mr. Kirby? 
HUNTER You may want to ask Mr. Kirby, yes. 
JUDGE Mr. Kirby, whose signature is that? 
KIRBY That is the signature of Suzanne Martin. 
JUDGE Ms. Martin, can you confirm that is your signature? 
MARTIN Yes it is. 
JUDGE Exhibit #8 is the second page of the Termination Notice, indicates items to be 
collected from the claimant. Exhibit #9 is an email from Ashley Jensen to Suzanne 
Martin with an attachment showing an email from the receptionist to Ashley Jensen. 
That email—those two emails are both dated May 12,2008. Exhibit #10 is a page from 
the employer's policy book titled "Your Work Environment" specified the conduct 
while at work. And Exhibit #11 is another page from the employer's handbook 
regarding harassment. Exhibit #12 is the employee's acknowledgment of receipt of the 
employee handbook. I'm showing a date that it was signed was January 16th of 2006. 
Ms. Haggard, is that your signature? 
CLAIMANT Yes it is. 
JUDGE Exhibit #13, I'm showing an email from Ashley Jensen to Suzanne Martin. This is on 
April 23, 2008. Exhibit 14 is employee counseling report, dated March 18, 2008 
regarding Debbie Haggard. This indicates continuing to talk about people behind their 
back and being negative at work. It says "Plan of action: this behavior needs to stop 
immediately." And I'm showing a signature which appears to be Ms. Martin's 
signature again. Is that your signature, Ms. Martin? 
MARTIN Yes. 
JUDGE This document does not show a signature by Ms. Haggard. Exhibit #15 is another page 
of email, this one from February 7, 2008. There is more than one email on this page but 
it appears to be a correspondence between Ashley Jensen and Suzanne Martin. Exhibit 
#16 is the second page to that email. However there is no writing on it other than the 
words 'thanks' and the social security number. Exhibit #17 is a termination notice. 
This is a different termination notice which was dated October 22, 2007 with the 
6 
ADDENDUM E 
notation to not terminate "Debbie says she will work on her attitude, we will give her 
one more chance." The bottom in typed letters indicates the form was completed by 
Suzanne Martin. Exhibit 18 is the second page to that termination notice. Exhibit 19 is 
a page from the employer's uh hand—uh policy book which refers to their 
communications systems. Specifically you cannot use company communication 
systems to transmit, receive, store information material or communication that is 
obscene, discriminatory or rude, etcetera. Exhibit 20 is another acknowledgement of 
the receipt of that handbook. This is also dated January 16,2006. This appears to be a 
copy of the other acknowledgment page. Would you agree with that, Ms. Martin? 
MARTIN Yes. 
JUDGE And Ms. Haggard, is that your signature again? 
CLAIMANT Yes. 
JUDGE Exhibit 21 is an email from Ashley Jensen to Suzanne Martin dated October 19, 2007. 
This goes on to describe information about the claimant Ms. Haggard, discussions 
overheard by Ashley Jensen. Exhibit—our next few exhibits are a bunch of emails so 
I'm just going to go through them as fast as I can. Exhibit 22 is an email between 
Ashley Jensen and Suzanne Martin in regards to information for Michelle Baker. 
However, I may need more explanation on this one as we get further into the hearing 
because these emails from Angela Olson are in - the font that she uses I cannot read it. 
It's very unclear in my copies. 
CLAIMANT Same with mine. 
JUDGE Is that Ms. Haggard? 
CLAIMANT Yes. Yes, I have a really hard time and one I couldn't even hardly read. 
JUDGE Exhibit 23 is another email. This is also from Angela Olson, this one dated October 
19, 2007.1 can't read that one. Exhibit 24 is another email from Angela Olson which I 
cannot read. Exhibit 25 is the second page of the email from Exhibit 24. Just for the 
record the email on Exhibit 24 is dated October 2nd, but it actually appears to be two 
emails from Angela Olson, started on Exhibit 24, as well as one email on Exhibit 24 
from Ashley Jensen. And the email from Angela Olson continued over to Exhibit 25. 
Starting with Exhibit 26, um, or actually Exhibit 26 is an email from Debbie Haggard 
to the receptionist. There are two emails on here. The second email is from the 
receptionist to Debbie Haggard. This appears to be communication about some of the 
employees who had taken a lunch break. 















































JUDGE I'm not going to ask for explanation now. 
CLAIMANT The receptionist is actually first and the second one is mine. You've got to go 
backwards. 
JUDGE The date on this is September 19, 2007.1 think it's the next three or four exhibits 
starting with Exhibit #27 appears to be communication between Courtney Baker and 
Debbie Haggard, having a discussion about some other employees in the office via 
email. This took place on September 19,2007. Exhibit 27 is the end to the 
communication showing the last email was sent from Courtney Baker to Debbie 
Haggard at 9:22 AM on September 19, 2007. Exhibit 28 is the earlier emails, um, 
between Ms. Baker and Ms. Haggard. Exhibit 29 again is earlier emails in that 
conversation between the two employees. And Exhibit #30 would be the start of that 
communication. I'm showing that it was started from Courtney Baker to receptionist 
Debbie Haggard. That was started at 7:57 AM September 19, 2007. Exhibit 31 is 
entitled Separation Statement Discharge. This would be response to the claimant -
information the claimant provided online when she opened her claim, as well as a 
description of a conversation between the Department representative and the claimant. 
Exhibit 32 is the first page of a statement of job discharges the claimant filled out on 
which she indicated her last day of work the 15th of May and she goes into some detail 
about the reason for separation. Exhibit 33 is a letter typed by the claimant that was 
sent along with that questionnaire that she filled out, in which she describes the events 
that led up to her termination. Exhibit 34 is the second page to that letter. Exhibit 35 is 
the third page to the letter as well as her signature. Is that your signature Ms. Haggard? 
CLAIMANT Yes it is. 
JUDGE Exhibit 36 is the second page to the claimant's statement of job discharge - the form 
which she completed. And is that your signature on the bottom of the form, Ms. 
Haggard? 
CLAIMANT Yes it is. 
JUDGE Exhibit 37 is entitled Decisions Details. This would be the Department 
representative's reasoning for denying unemployment insurance benefits. Exhibit 38 is 
the decision letter that was mailed to the claimant indicating that benefits were denied. 
And Exhibit 39 is the claimant's appeal. It was filed online on May 30th, 2008. Ms. 
Haggard did you prepare this appeal yourself? 
CLAIMANT I did. 
JUDGE That is the end to our exhibits for the hearing. Ms. Haggard do you have any objection 




JUDGE Mr. Hunter do you have any objection to me considering these documents as I make 
my decision today? 
HUNTER No objection. 
JUDGE Exhibits 1 through 39 are entered into the record. Mr. Haggard (sic) based on the 
evidence you have, what was the reason the claimant was ultimately discharged? 
CLAIMANT Are you talking to me? 
JUDGE Mr. Hunter? 
CLAIMANT Oh, Mr. Hunter. 
HUNTER Uh, the reason for her discharge were inappropriate comments made about another 
employee. 
JUDGE Okay, now as we proceed perhaps you prefer that I question your witnesses regarding 
this? 
HUNTER Urn, it is probably best you ask the questions of Mr. Kirby. 
JUDGE Okay. Mr. Kirby, are you there? 
KIRBY I am here. 
JUDGE Are you the one who discharged the claimant? 
KIRBY I am. 
JUDGE Based on the documents we have it appears her last day of work was April 15, or May 
15, 2008. Is that the same day that termination took place? 
KIRBY Yes it is. 
JUDGE What was the reason she was terminated? 
KIRBY For making an inappropriate remark at work. Specifically she mentioned that her and 
the receptionist were Suzanne's 'little niggers.' 
JUDGE Who was the receptionist that this comment was made to? 














































MARTIN I was told that Michelle Baker had told Ashley that this comment was made to her. 
And when Ashley told me, Ashley is Michelle's direct supervisor, and then I am 
Ashley's direct supervisor. So Ashley told me' and I asked her if she would ask 
Michelle to send an email summarizing what—stating what was said. 
JUDGE Okay we already have Exhibit #9 which is that email, correct? 
MARTIN Right, that's what that came from. So she, Michelle, sent that email to Ashley and then 
Ashley forwarded it on to me. And then I actually sent it on to my boss who is the 
CEO to make a decision. 
JUDGE Are you referring to Chad Kirby or someone else? 
MARTIN No, my boss is David Hill. He's the CEO of the company. 
JUDGE Okay. And again, you did not witness this comment being made? 
MARTIN I did not. 
JUDGE I'm going to question Ms. Baker later on about that comment since you don't have any 
personal knowledge of that event that took place. I want to move on to something you 
might know personally. Have you ever given Ms. Haggard any warnings about the type 
of language she used at work or any inappropriate discussions she might have at work. 
MARTIN Yes. 
JUDGE When was the last time you warned her? 
MARTIN We talked on March 18,1 think that was that verbal warning one, the copy that's in 
there. 
JUDGE Can you refer me to that, please? 
MARTIN Yes, sorry. 
CLAIMANT Exhibit 14. 
MARTIN Right. Exhibit 14. 
JUDGE Okay. Exhibit 14 I'll indicate again this indicates—this states continuing to talk about 
people behind their backs and being negative in the work environment. Can you tell 
me what instigated this warning? 




JUDGE Ms. Martin? 
MARTIN Yes, yes, I'm sorry. Right. Um, I had heard that she was saying—we have several 
different departments in our office. Customer services department, accounting 
department, and I had heard her saying that the customer service people weren't doing 
their job. And didn't really know what they were doing and getting away with doing 
nothing. 
JUDGE Did you have a discussion with her about these rumors that you had heard? 
MARTIN Yes. 
JUDGE What did you explain to her in this discussion? 
MARTIN Well we had previously spoke and that was that other termination back in October 
that— 
JUDGE We'll get to that one in just a moment. 
MARTIN It's just—I was referring to that and said that, you know, things had gotten better that 
now it sounded like, um, she was falling back into talking about people and it just 
needed to stop because we have a policy around here that we don't talk about other 
people. Especially not negatively. And it needed to stop. 
JUDGE During that meeting did she express any concern about what she was complaining 
about? 
MARTIN She denied that she'd said anything. 
JUDGE Is there a reason you did not have her sign the warning? 
MARTIN Because I was, yes, because I was considering it a verbal warning I didn't have her 
sign it. 
JUDGE At the bottom of the page, Ms. Martin, it indicates failure to comply with the plan of 
action will result in termination. That indicates the plan of action which states verbal 
warning, written warning, suspension, formal probation for a period of so many days. 
Um, is this a plan of action that is routinely followed by the employer? 
MARTIN Yes. 
JUDGE So after the comment that occurred on May 15, is there a reason the next step was not 

























































I'm sorry, say that again. 
I'm looking—I'm sure—it appears to me that there is a progressive plan of action as 
indicated on the bottom of this form on Exhibit 14. I'm not showing any other warning 
similar to this one as part of my records today so I'm wondering if there's a reason, as 
a result of the comment that took place on May 15 the employer jumped from verbal 
warning to termination rather than taking the steps of written warning or even 
suspension. 
The comment that was made on May—to Michelle, on whatever date, May 12, it was 
all in that email, was more egregious than anything else that had been done. It wasn't 
talking about people behind their backs; it wasn't necessarily related to the other 
things that had happened. It's an outright violation of our policy of our standards at 
work. We have a mixed race company and our ownership is very adamant about the 
fact that we are not a racial, racist company. And so it was—and so it was felt by the ' 
ownership that any racial comment in and of itself was grounds for dismissal. Even if 
there hadn't been any other incident prior. 
Okay. So we have the verbal warning that took place on the 18th. You also made 
mention of the prior incident in October where you were going to terminate her but 
you did not. Before we discuss that was there anything that occurred between October 
and this March 18th warning that was documented? 
No. 
Had you had any discussions with her between that time regarding her demeanor at 
work or her talking negatively about other employees? 
No. 
Can you tell me what incident led up to the itici—uh, to the tie you were going to 
discharge her in October of 2007? 
I'm going to refer to the email that started back in Exhibit (pause) 21 and on. Um, 
there was many times of, uh, her talking badly about other employees and these were 
documented—they were never sent to me, I never was privy to these. 
Okay, let's go through them real quick just so I can get an understanding. Because 




JUDGE Okay, you'll be given an opportunity to testify in a few moments. You can give your 
difference of opinion at that time, okay? 
CLAIMANT Okay, thank you. 
JUDGE Make sure you're taking notes so you don't forget what you want to say. 
CLAIMANT Okay. 
JUDGE Ms. Baker, are you there? 
BAKER Yes. 
JUDGE Ms. Baker I want to address primarily the final incident with you. It's been reported by 
Ms. Martin that the comment which resulted in the termination of the claimant was 
made to you. Is that correct? 
BAKER It was. 
JUDGE Okay I want to refer back to the email which you wrote regarding that incident which 
is Exhibit #9. In this it shows an email from Ashley Jensen to Susan Martin dated 
April 2008. Did you write this email? 
BAKER I did. 
JUDGE In this email it goes on to describe what comment Ms. Haggard made to you. Can you 
explain—can you tell me what comment that was? 
BAKER Um, she came down to ask me if I could help her find some files that she was asked to 
find and, um, she was—I was making a copy, uh, the paper that she had been given to 
find the files. And she came up to me and said that - she got up to me really close and 
said that - she said, "I guess that you and I are Suzanne's little niggers." And it kind 
of took me back back— 
JUDGE Did she use that word specifically. Or did she use another word that might have 
alluded to that - to something - to a negative word? 
BAKER No sir, that word specifically. And I made sure. I asked her again and she said that 
again. So. It was that exact word. 
JUDGE After that comment was made to you what did you do? 




































































You've already told me that you asked her to repeat it. What I want to know is after 
you asked her to repeat it what did you do? 
I kind of just sat back and was shocked and she walked away and so I-I didn't know 
what to do really. 
Did you report it to somebody? 
Yes I did, I reported it to Ashley. 
Ms. Baker, were you involved in any of the other communications that Ms. Martin 
referred to earlier in the hearing? 
No, just the emails that were sent back and forth. 
Okay let me check through these real quick, (pause) Okay I don't have any other 
questions for you, Ms. Baker. Mr. Hunter, do you have any questions for Ms. Baker? 
Nothing for Ms. Baker. 
Ms. Haggard, do you have any questions for Ms. Baker. 
NT No, like I said, just response. 
Ms. Jensen, are you there? 
Yes. 
What was your relation to the claimant at work? 
What was that? 
What was your relation to the claimant while at work, to Ms. Haggard? 
Supervisor. 
Di you ever give Ms. Haggard any warnings? 
I did not. 
Were you involved in any of these email communications that Ms. Martin isreferring 
to that were negative communications? 
Yes. 
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